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The Halo Effect: Willful Infringement and Enhanced Damages in Light of Halo 
Abstract 
The Supreme Court’s decision in Halo Electronics, Inc. v. Pulse Electronics, Inc. overruled the United 
States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit’s longstanding Seagate test and empowered district courts 
to exercise their discretion in deciding whether to enhance damages for willful patent infringement. In the 
three years since the Halo decision, district courts have developed their own approaches to addressing 
willfulness allegations at the various stages of litigation, including pleading, summary judgment, trial, and 
post-trial. This Article observes trends in how district courts have addressed willfulness claims at each 
stage of litigation, highlights factors courts have considered when declining to enhance damages for an 
infringer’s egregious misconduct, and identifies practice tips in view of the emerging trends in the case 
law. 





THE HALO EFFECT:  
WILLFUL INFRINGEMENT AND ENHANCED 
DAMAGES IN LIGHT OF HALO 
RACHEL WEINER COHEN*, HOLLY VICTORSON** & KELLYE QUIRK*** 
The Supreme Court’s decision in Halo Electronics, Inc. v. Pulse Electronics, 
Inc. overruled the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit’s long-
standing Seagate test and empowered district courts to exercise their discretion in 
deciding whether to enhance damages for willful patent infringement. In the three 
years since the Halo decision, district courts have developed their own approaches 
to addressing willfulness allegations at the various stages of litigation, including 
pleading, summary judgment, trial, and post-trial. This Article observes trends in 
how district courts have addressed willfulness claims at each stage of litigation, 
highlights factors courts have considered when declining to enhance damages 
for an infringer’s egregious misconduct, and identifies practice tips in view of 
the emerging trends in the case law. 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Introduction .............................................................................. 1068 
    I.    Willfulness and Enhanced Damages Historically .......... 1070 
A.   The Development of the Willfulness Doctrine ...... 1070 
B.   Potential Factors for Enhancing Damages ............. 1069 
    II.    The Supreme Court’s Halo Opinion ............................ 1074 
 
 * Counsel, Latham & Watkins LLP. 
 ** Associate, Latham & Watkins LLP. 
 *** J.D. Candidate, May 2020, University of Virginia School of Law. Summer Associate, 
Latham & Watkins LLP, 2019. 
1068 AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 69:1067 
 
    III.    Willfulness and Enhanced Damages Trends in                  
Light of Halo ................................................................... 1076 
A.   Disposing of Willfulness Claims Pre-Trial ............... 1076 
1. Motions to dismiss willful infringement  
 claims .................................................................. 1077 
a. Pre-suit knowledge. ...................................... 1077 
b. Misconduct ................................................... 1079 
c. Practice tips .................................................. 1080 
2. Summary judgment of no willful  
 infringement ....................................................... 1081 
a. Requisite knowledge ...................................... 1082 
b. Knowledge alone is insufficient .................. 1082 
c. Misconduct ................................................... 1083 
d. Practice tips .................................................. 1085 
B.   Willfulness Resolved on the Trial Record .............. 1085 
1. Judgment as a matter of law of no willful 
infringement ....................................................... 1086 
2. Jury verdict of willful infringement  
 supported by substantial evidence .................... 1087 
a. Copying ........................................................ 1088 
b. Knowledge of infringement ........................ 1088 
c. Disregard for the risk of infringement ....... 1089 
d. Dishonesty or lack of candor ....................... 1090 
3. Practice tips ......................................................... 1090 
C.   Enhanced Damages ................................................. 1091 
1. Practice tips ......................................................... 1093 
Conclusion ................................................................................. 1094 
INTRODUCTION 
To punish and deter willful or bad-faith infringement of valid and 
enforceable patents, infringers found to willfully infringe may face 
enhanced damages. The patent law system has long permitted treble 
damages for infringement of a valid patent. Since the Patent Act of 
1793, Congress has allowed (and, for some time, mandated) treble 
damages if a patent owner prevails on its infringement claim. The 
current iteration of the patent damages statute simply states that “the 
court may increase the damages up to three times the amount found 
or assessed.”1 In an attempt to interpret the patent damages statute, 
 
 1. 35 U.S.C. § 284 (2012). 
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courts have repeatedly weighed in on the appropriate standards for 
determining whether infringing conduct is willful and, as a result, 
damages may be enhanced. Most recently, the Supreme Court discussed 
enhanced patent damages in Halo Electronics, Inc. v. Pulse Electronics, Inc.2 In 
Halo, the Court considered the Federal Circuit’s two-part test in In re Seagate 
Technology, LLC3 and rejected it as unduly rigid and inconsistent with the 
patent damages statute.4 The Court emphasized that the statute “gives 
district courts the discretion to award enhanced damages against those 
guilty of patent infringement.”5 Recognizing, however, that discretion is not 
whim, the Court emphasized that “district courts are ‘to be guided by [the] 
sound legal principles’ developed over nearly two centuries of application 
and interpretation of the Patent Act.”6 And in accordance with the statute’s 
grant of discretion to the district court, the Supreme Court held that its 
decision whether to award enhanced damages, and any resulting 
enhancement, “is to be reviewed on appeal for abuse of discretion.”7 
Since the Halo decision over three years ago, many patent cases have 
progressed through the various stages of litigation, including pleading, 
summary judgment, trial, and post-trial. Because Halo left the decision 
of whether to enhance damages to the discretion of district court 
judges, district courts have developed their own approaches to address 
willfulness allegations at each stage of litigation. Some courts have 
disposed of willful infringement claims pre-trial on a motion to dismiss 
or motion for summary judgment, while others have let the question 
of willfulness go to the jury.8 Upon a finding of willfulness, some courts 
 
 2. 136 S. Ct. 1923 (2016). 
 3. 497 F.3d 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (en banc). 
 4. Halo, 136 S. Ct. at 1928. 
 5. Id. at 1935; see also 35 U.S.C. § 284 (“[T]he court may increase the damages up 
to three times the amount found or assessed.” (emphasis added)). 
 6. Halo, 136 S. Ct. at 1935 (alteration in original) (quoting Martin v. Franklin 
Capital Corp., 546 U.S. 132, 139 (2005)). 
 7. Id. at 1934 (quoting Highmark Inc. v. Allcare Health Mgmt. Sys., Inc., 572 U.S. 
559, 563 (2014)). 
 8. See, e.g., Meridian Mfg., Inc. v. C & B Mfg., Inc., 340 F. Supp. 3d 808, 844 (N.D. 
Iowa 2018) (motion for summary judgment denied); Novartis Vaccines & Diagnostics, 
Inc. v. Regeneron Pharm., Inc., No. 18cv2434(DLC), 2018 WL 5282887, at *1–3 
(S.D.N.Y. Oct. 24, 2018) (motion to dismiss granted); Bobcar Media, LLC v. Aardvark 
Event Logistics, Inc., No. 16-CV-885 (JPO), 2017 WL 74729, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 4, 
2017) (motion to dismiss denied); Koninklijke Philips N.V. v. Zoll Med. Corp., 257 F. 
Supp. 3d 159, 163 (D. Mass. 2017) (motion for summary judgment granted). 
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have exercised their discretion to award some multiple (up to three 
times) of damages, and others have declined to enhance damages.9 
This Article reviews how district courts are addressing willful 
infringement allegations and requests for enhanced damages in light 
of Halo. Part I reviews the evolution of awarding enhanced damages 
for willful infringement pre-Halo. Part II discusses the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Halo. Part III reviews trends observed in district court cases 
after Halo, including how willful infringement claims are disposed of 
before trial, how willfulness is resolved on a trial record, and how 
courts decide whether to enhance damages after a willfulness finding. 
Throughout the discussion, this Article also identifies practice tips 
considering the emerging trends. 
I.    WILLFULNESS AND ENHANCED DAMAGES HISTORICALLY 
As the Supreme Court recognized, “[e]nhanced damages are as old 
as U.S. patent law.”10 Nevertheless, the law around enhanced damages 
continues to evolve following congressional acts and court rulings. 
Relevant highlights are set forth below. 
A.   The Development of the Willfulness Doctrine 
In its second session, Congress enacted the Patent Act of 1790, which 
required an infringing party to pay the patentee monetary damages.11 
Shortly thereafter, Congress enacted the Patent Act of 1793, which 
mandated that actual damages based on the price of the patentee’s 
invention be, at a minimum, trebled in any successful suit.12 
Congress has since limited the patentee’s ability to obtain multiples of 
actual damages to treble damages. The Patent Act of 1800 limited a 
patentee’s recovery to three times the verdict.13 The Patent Act of 1836 
introduced district court discretion in determining enhanced damages, 
not to exceed treble damages.14 The Patent Act of 1952, codified at 35 
 
 9. See, e.g., Crane Sec. Techs., Inc. v. Rolling Optics AB, 337 F. Supp. 3d 48, 60 
(D. Mass. 2018) (awarding enhanced damages); Schwendimann v. Arkwright 
Advanced Coating, Inc., Civ. No. 11-820 (JRT/HB), 2018 WL 3621206, at *15 (D. 
Minn. July 30, 2018) (declining to award enhanced damages). 
 10. Halo, 136 S. Ct. at 1928; see also Act of Feb. 21, 1793, ch. 11, § 5, 1 Stat. 318, 322 
(repealed 1836). 
 11. Act of Apr. 10, 1790, ch. 7, § 5, 1 Stat. 109, 111 (repealed 1836). 
 12. Act of Feb. 21, 1793, ch. 11, § 5, 1 Stat. 318, 322 (repealed 1836). 
 13. Act of Apr. 17, 1800, ch. 25, § 3, 2 Stat. 37, 38 (repealed 1836). 
 14. Act of July 4, 1836, ch. 357, § 14, 5 Stat. 117, 123. 
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U.S.C. § 284, still governs patent damages today. Under § 284, upon a 
finding of infringement, “the court may increase the damages up to 
three times the amount found or assessed.”15 Although Congress has 
changed the amount of enhanced damages available to a patent holder, 
Congress has not provided courts with guidance for determining when, 
or to what extent, to enhance damages.16 
In the absence of legislative instruction, the judiciary developed 
guidelines for courts to follow. These guidelines became known as the 
willfulness doctrine. As early as 1854, the Supreme Court described the 
“very great injustice” that resulted from the mandatory enhancement of 
damages across all cases without regard to their merits.17 The Court 
reversed an enhanced damages award, stating its unwillingness to punish 
an infringer “who acted in ignorance or good faith,” and limited such 
punitive damages to infringers exhibiting “wanton or malicious” behavior.18 
The courts continued to develop the willfulness doctrine over the years.19 
More recently, in 2007, the Federal Circuit, sitting en banc, 
addressed the standard for determining willfulness in Seagate.20 Prior 
to Seagate, the applicable willfulness standard at the time imposed “an 
affirmative duty [on a potential infringer] to exercise due care to 
determine whether or not he is infringing.”21 As the Seagate court 
pointed out, that “standard was announced shortly after the creation of 
the court, and at a time ‘when widespread disregard of patent rights was 
undermining the national innovation incentive.’”22 However, the court 
noted that “[t]he term willful is not unique to patent law, and it has a well-
established meaning in the civil context,” which includes reckless, but not 
merely negligent, behavior captured by the due care standard.23 The 
court concluded that the due care standard could allow an infringer to be 
 
 15. 35 U.S.C. § 284 (2012). 
 16. See Justin P. Huddleson, Note, Objectively Reckless: A Semi-Empirical Evaluation of In re 
Seagate, 15 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 102, 105 (2009) (reviewing the history of 35 U.S.C. § 284). 
 17. Seymour v. McCormick, 57 U.S. 480, 488–89 (1854). 
 18. Id. at 488–89, 491. 
 19. See Huddleson, supra note 16, at 105 (reviewing the history of 35 U.S.C. § 284). 
 20. In re Seagate Tech., LLC, 497 F.3d 1360, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2007). 
 21. Underwater Devices Inc. v. Morrison-Knudsen Co., 717 F.2d 1380, 1389 (Fed. 
Cir. 1983), overruled by Seagate, 497 F.3d 1360. 
 22. Seagate, 497 F.3d at 1369 (quoting Knorr-Bremse Systeme Fuer Nutzfahrzeuge 
GmbH v. Dana Corp., 383 F.3d 1337, 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (en banc)). 
 23. Id. at 1370–71. 
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subject to punitive damages for merely negligent behavior, contrary to 
the interpretation of willfulness in other civil contexts.24 
Accordingly, Seagate created a two-part test for willful infringement. 
First, “a patentee must show by clear and convincing evidence that the 
infringer acted despite an objectively high likelihood that its actions 
constituted infringement of a valid patent.”25 This came to be known as 
the “objective” prong.26 The court noted that “[t]he state of mind of the 
accused infringer [was] not relevant” in this step.27 Second, a patentee 
must show that the risk of infringement “was either known or so obvious 
that it should have been known to the accused infringer.”28 This second 
requirement came to be known as the “subjective” prong.29 
Seagate’s two-pronged review resulted in a complicated tripartite 
appellate review rubric for any enhanced damages award. First, courts 
treated Seagate’s objective prong as a question of law, subject to de novo 
appellate review.30 The objective inquiry also created a loophole that 
allowed a malicious infringer to avoid enhanced damages so long as a 
lawyer could later develop some objectively reasonable legal theory of 
noninfringement or invalidity.31 Second, the patent owner had to 
prove Seagate’s subjective prong by clear and convincing evidence,32 
which was reviewed for substantial evidence on appeal. Third, the 
ultimate decision of whether to award enhanced damages was reviewed 
for abuse of discretion.33 
 
 
 24. Id. at 1371 (contrasting the due care standard with willfulness as a statutory 
condition of civil liability for punitive damages, as set forth in Safeco Ins. Co. of Am. v. 
Burr, 551 U.S. 47, 53 (2007)). 
 25. Id. at 1371. 
 26. See Spine Sols., Inc. v. Medtronic Sofamor Danek USA, Inc., 620 F.3d 1305, 
1319 (Fed. Cir. 2010). 
 27. Seagate, 497 F.3d at 1371. 
 28. Id. 
 29. See i4i Ltd. P’ship v. Microsoft Corp., 598 F.3d 831, 860 (Fed. Cir. 2010). 
 30. See Bard Peripheral Vascular, Inc. v. W.L. Gore & Assocs., Inc., 682 F.3d 1003, 
1005 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (remanding to the trial court to make a determination on the 
objective Seagate prong as a question of law); Christopher B. Seaman, Willful Patent 
Infringement and Enhanced Damages After In re Seagate: An Empirical Study, 97 IOWA L. REV. 
417, 445 (2012) (finding “an increase in district-court decisions granting motions for 
[judgment as a matter of law] during trial on willfulness after Seagate”). 
 31. Dmitry Karshtedt, Enhancing Patent Damages, 51 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1427, 1459 (2018). 
 32. Seagate, 497 F.3d at 1371. 
 33. Halo Elecs., Inc. v. Pulse Elecs., Inc., 136 S. Ct. 1923, 1930 (2016). 
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B.   Potential Factors for Enhancing Damages 
The patent damages statute permits the district court to exercise its 
discretion to enhance damages against an infringer up to three times 
the amount of actual damages awarded.34 A district court may address 
whether enhanced damages should be awarded “once an affirmative 
finding of willfulness has been made.”35 Therefore, once willful infringement 
has been found, the district court in its discretion must decide whether to 
enhance damages and by how much (up to the statutory maximum). The 
central determination in whether to grant an enhancement, and in what 
amount (up to the statutory maximum), “is the egregiousness of the 
defendant’s conduct based on all the facts and circumstances.”36 
Although not required, district courts commonly consider the 
factors the Federal Circuit laid out in Read Corp. v. Portec, Inc.37 to 
determine when an infringer’s misconduct merits the enhancement of 
damages.38 The Read factors include:  
(1) [W]hether the infringer deliberately copied the ideas or designs 
of another; 
(2) [W]hether the infringer, when he knew of the other’s patent 
protection, investigated the scope of the patent and formed a good-
faith belief that it was invalid or that it was not infringed; . . . 
(3) [T]he infringer’s behavior as a party to the litigation[;] 
(4) Defendant’s size and financial condition[;] 
(5) Closeness of the case[;] 
(6) Duration of defendant’s misconduct[;] 
(7) Remedial action by the defendant[;] 
(8) Defendant’s motivation for harm[; and] 
(9) Whether defendant attempted to conceal its misconduct.39 
Irrespective of whether the district court considers the Read factors, it 
must explain the basis for an enhanced damages award.40 
 
 34. 35 U.S.C. § 284 (2012). 
 35. Eko Brands, LLC v. Adrian Rivera Maynez Enters., Inc., 946 F.3d 1367, 1378 
(Fed. Cir. 2020); see also Seagate, 497 F.3d at 1368 (citing Beatrice Foods Co. v. New 
Eng. Printing & Lithographing Co., 923 F.2d 1576, 1578 (Fed. Cir. 1991)). 
 36. Read Corp. v. Portec, Inc., 970 F.2d 816, 826 (Fed. Cir. 1992). 
 37. 970 F.2d 816 (Fed. Cir. 1992). 
 38. Id. at 826. 
 39. 970 F.2d at 827 (footnote omitted) (citations omitted). 
 40. See Polara Eng’g Inc. v. Campbell Co., 894 F.3d 1339, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2018) 
(“Although ‘the district court is not required to discuss the Read factors,’ it ‘is obligated 
to explain the basis for the [enhanced damages] award, particularly where the 
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II.    THE SUPREME COURT’S HALO OPINION 
In Halo, Chief Justice Roberts, writing for a unanimous Court, 
addressed the question of whether the two-part inquiry set forth by the 
Federal Circuit in Seagate was consistent with 35 U.S.C. § 284.41 The 
Supreme Court concluded that it was not.42 
The Court first examined the plain text of § 284, observing that the 
“language contains no explicit limit or condition, and we have 
emphasized that the ‘word “may” clearly connotes discretion.’”43 At the 
same time, however, the Court recognized that in awarding damages 
under § 284, district courts should exercise their discretion in light of 
underlying considerations.44 The Court explained: 
Awards of enhanced damages under the Patent Act over the past 180 
years establish that they are not to be meted out in a typical 
infringement case, but are instead designed as a “punitive” or 
“vindictive” sanction for egregious infringement behavior. The sort of 
conduct warranting enhanced damages has been variously described in 
our cases as willful, wanton, malicious, bad-faith, deliberate, consciously 
wrongful, flagrant, or—indeed—characteristic of a pirate.45 
The Court recognized that the Seagate test “reflects, in many respects, a 
sound recognition that enhanced damages are generally appropriate 
under § 284 only in egregious cases,” but held that the test is unduly rigid 
in constricting the discretion granted to the district courts.46 In particular, 
the Court criticized the Seagate test because it (1) required a finding of 
objective recklessness to award enhanced damages; (2) required clear and 
convincing evidence to prove recklessness; and (3) employed a tripartite 
framework for appellate review that removed the enhanced damages 
determination from the district court’s discretion.47 
First, the Court noted that Seagate’s requirement of a finding of 
objective recklessness can in effect insulate from liability for enhanced 
 
maximum amount is imposed.’” (internal citations omitted) (first quoting Presidio 
Components, Inc. v. Am. Tech. Ceramics Corp., 875 F.3d 1369, 1382 (Fed. Cir. 2017); 
then quoting Read, 970 F.2d at 828)). 
 41. Halo Elecs., Inc. v. Pulse Elecs., Inc., 136 S. Ct. 1923, 1928 (2016). 
 42. Id. at 1928. 
 43. Id. at 1931 (quoting Martin v. Franklin Capital Corp., 546 U.S. 132, 136 (2005)). 
 44. Id. at 1932 (citing Octane Fitness, LLC v. Icon Health & Fitness, Inc., 572 U.S. 
545, 554 (2014)). 
 45. Id. 
 46. Id. 
 47. Id. at 1932, 1934. 
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damages some of the worst patent infringers.48 Under Seagate, the 
existence of a reasonable defense at trial shields the infringer from 
enhanced damages, even in cases where the infringer did not act on 
the basis of the reasonable defense or was not even aware of it.49 But 
allowing an infringer to escape enhanced damages “solely on the strength 
of his attorney’s ingenuity” later at trial is inconsistent with the fact that 
“culpability is generally measured against the knowledge of the actor at 
the time of the challenged conduct.”50 The Court determined that the 
Seagate test unduly restricts the district court’s ability “to punish the full 
range of culpable behavior” under § 284.51 The Court directed that courts 
should decide whether to award damages, and in what amount, given the 
particular facts of the case without “inelastic restraints.”52 The Court also 
cautioned that “none of this is to say that enhanced damages must follow 
a finding of egregious misconduct.”53 
Second, the Court criticized the Seagate test because it required “clear 
and convincing evidence to prove recklessness.”54 Because § 284 does 
not impose a specific evidentiary burden, the Court rejected a 
heightened standard of proof for an award of enhanced damages.55 The 
Court emphasized that a preponderance of the evidence standard has 
always governed patent infringement litigation and there is no exception 
for enhanced damages.56 
Third, the Court rejected Seagate’s tripartite framework for appellate 
review.57 The Court emphasized that “[§] 284 gives district courts 
discretion in meting out enhanced damages” and therefore the 
determination should be reviewed on appeal for abuse of discretion.58 
In conclusion, the Court emphasized that nearly two centuries of case 
law under the Patent Act provides sound legal principles that guide 
district courts to exercise their discretion to award enhanced damages in 
“egregious cases of misconduct beyond typical infringement.”59 The 
 
 48. Id. at 1932. 
 49. Id. at 1933. 
 50. Id. 
 51. Id. at 1933–34. 
 52. Id. 
 53. Id. at 1933. 
 54. Id. at 1934. 
 55. Id. (citing Octane Fitness, LLC v. Icon Health & Fitness, Inc., 572 U.S. 545, 557 (2014)). 
 56. Id. (citing Octane Fitness, 572 U.S. at 557). 
 57. Id. at 1934. 
 58. Id. 
 59. Id. at 1935. 
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Court abrogated the unduly restrictive Seagate test in favor of providing 
district courts more flexibility to enhance damages.60 
Justice Breyer, joined by Justices Kennedy and Alito, joined Chief 
Justice Roberts’ majority opinion but also penned a concurring opinion. 
Justice Breyer wrote separately to highlight that § 284 imposes limits that 
promote uniformity and consistency in the law’s application.61 In 
particular, Justice Breyer noted that “the Court’s references to ‘willful 
misconduct’ do not mean that a court may award enhanced damages 
simply because the evidence shows that the infringer knew about the patent 
and nothing more.”62 He emphasized that enhanced damages amount to a 
“punitive” sanction and should be reserved for only egregious cases.63 
III.    WILLFULNESS AND ENHANCED DAMAGES TRENDS IN                  
LIGHT OF HALO 
To understand how district courts have implemented the Supreme 
Court’s Halo decision, we reviewed subsequent court opinions that 
address willfulness claims and/or requests for enhanced damages. In 
particular, we reviewed the posture upon which district courts 
considered willfulness, including decisions that address willfulness on 
a motion to dismiss, summary judgment, and judgment as a matter of 
law. Decisions disposing of willfulness claims pre-trial are analyzed in 
Section III.A. Decisions considering the substantial evidence for jury 
verdicts involving willful infringement claims are analyzed in Section 
III.B. Decisions evaluating whether to award enhanced damages after 
the jury found willful infringement are analyzed in Section III.C. 
A.   Disposing of Willfulness Claims Pre-Trial 
Parties to a patent litigation have two primary opportunities64 to 
dispose of willful infringement claims before the question is set for 
trial. First, at the outset of the case, the accused infringer can file a 
motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be 
granted under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Second, 
 
 60. Id. 
 61. Id. at 1936 (Breyer, J., concurring). 
 62. Id. 
 63. Id. 
 64. There may be other opportunities, for example, on a Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 12(c) motion for judgment on the pleadings or on a motion in limine. We 
focus on motions to dismiss and motions for summary judgment as these postures 
repeatedly appeared in the case law. 
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either party can move for summary judgment on the issue under 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56. As discussed herein, sometimes 
these motions are successful. 
1. Motions to dismiss willful infringement claims 
Although courts may be reluctant to dismiss willful infringement at 
the pleading stage,65 some alleged infringers have successfully moved to 
dismiss for failure to state a claim. In deciding Rule 12(b)(6) motions, 
district courts have considered whether the complaint includes 
allegations of pre-suit knowledge of the patent(s)-in-suit and/or 
whether the accused infringer allegedly engaged in misconduct. 
a. Pre-suit knowledge. 
A bare allegation of willfulness without more may not survive a 
motion to dismiss. Some courts have required accused infringers to 
allege pre-suit knowledge of the asserted patent(s) to overcome a 
motion to dismiss a willfulness claim. For example, in Software Research, 
Inc. v. Dynatrace LLC,66 the patentee failed to plausibly allege pre-suit 
knowledge or notify the accused infringer of any of the asserted 
patents before filing suit.67 As a result, the patentee did not allege facts 
that are “willful, wanton, malicious, bad-faith, deliberate, consciously 
wrongful, flagrant, or—indeed—characteristic of a pirate.”68 
To avoid dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6), the patentees in Adidas 
America, Inc. v. Sketchers USA, Inc.69 had to sufficiently plead that the 
accused infringer had knowledge of the patent-in-suit (as well as the 
 
 65. See, e.g., Corephotonics, Ltd. v. Apple, Inc., No. 17-CV-06457-LHK, 2018 WL 
4772340, at *9 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 1, 2018) (denying motion to dismiss where factual 
allegations “raise the inference that [the accused infringer] was at least willfully blind 
to a high risk that it was infringing”); Finjan, Inc. v. SonicWall, Inc., No. 17-CV-04467-
BLF, 2018 WL 2234370, at *3 (N.D. Cal. May 16, 2018) (denying motion to dismiss 
where “the Complaint contain[ed] allegations that support a reasonable inference 
that [the alleged infringer] knew about its infringement for about three years, but 
notwithstanding that knowledge, engaged in disingenuous licensing negotiations”). 
 66. 316 F. Supp. 3d 1112 (N.D. Cal. 2018). 
 67. Id. at 1137. 
 68. Id. (quoting Halo Elecs., Inc. v. Pulse Elecs., Inc., 136 S. Ct. 1923, 1932 (2016)); 
see also BlackBerry Ltd. v. Nokia Corp., No. 17-cv-155-RGA, 2018 WL 1401330, at *3 (D. 
Del. Mar. 20, 2018) (“A party’s pre-suit knowledge of the patent is not sufficient by 
itself, however, to find ‘willful misconduct’ such that the Court can award enhanced 
damages.” (quoting Halo, 136 S. Ct. at 1936)). 
 69. No. 3:16-cv-1400-SI, 2017 WL 2543811, at *1 (D. Or. June 12, 2017). 
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allegation of infringement).70 But the patentees did not plead facts that 
would allow the Court to reasonably infer that the accused infringer knew 
of the patents-in-suit either when they issued or at any time before the 
patentees filed the lawsuit.71 Further, in Välinge Innovation AB v. Halstead 
New England Corp.,72 the district court set forth what it requires a patentee 
to plead to survive a motion to dismiss a willful infringement claim: 
[A patentee] must allege facts plausibly showing that as of the time 
of the claim’s filing, the accused infringer: (1) knew of the patent-
in-suit; (2) after acquiring that knowledge, it infringed the patent; 
and (3) in doing so, it knew, or should have known, that its conduct 
amounted to infringement of the patent.73 
This district court in Delaware noted the patentee could move for leave to 
amend to allege willfulness for any acts preceding the filing of the complaint.74 
Nevertheless, other district courts have held that Halo ended 
Seagate’s requirement that pre-suit conduct must be alleged, and the 
courts may now separately assess the adequacy of pre-suit and post-suit 
willfulness allegations. In other words, some courts have considered—
for example, on a motion to dismiss an amended complaint—the 
sufficiency of the patentee’s willfulness allegations based on the accused 
infringer’s conduct after receiving notice via the filing of the initial 
complaint. In M & C Innovations, LLC v. Igloo Products Corp.,75 the district 
court dismissed the patentee’s pre-suit and post-suit willfulness claims 
because the accused infringer had no pre-suit knowledge of the patent 
and the accused infringer’s post-suit conduct (i.e., manufacturing 
accused products) was the “kind of ‘garden-variety’ patent case that 
Halo affirms is ill-suited for a finding of willfulness.”76 
Meanwhile, some courts have found that “mere notice of the charge 
of infringement resulting from service of the complaint” is enough to 
 
 70. Id. at *3. 
 71. Id. at *4. 
 72. No. 16-1082-LPS-CJB, 2018 WL 2411218 (D. Del. May 29, 2018). 
 73. Id. at *13. 
 74. Id.; see also Wis. Alumni Research Found. v. Apple, Inc., 261 F. Supp. 3d 900, 
917–18 & n.6 (W.D. Wis. 2017) (“[Halo] did not upset the Federal Circuit’s holding in 
Seagate that the focus of such a claim should be on prelitigation conduct.”), aff’d in 
part, rev’d in part, 905 F.3d 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2018). 
 75. No. 4:17-CV-2372, 2018 WL 4620713 (S.D. Tex. July 31, 2018). 
 76. Id. at *3–6. 
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survive a motion to dismiss an enhanced damages claim.77 In fact, one 
such district court explained: 
[T]here is nothing in Halo suggesting that pre-suit knowledge is 
required for willfulness. In fact, Halo recognizes that “culpability is 
generally measured against the knowledge of the actor at the time 
of the challenged conduct.” Culpability can arise pre- or post-suit—
the scienter requirement is the same in either instance. The contrary 
conclusion would permit the very type of culpable behavior 
admonished by the Supreme Court in Halo simply because of timing. 
Such a conclusion is inconsistent with the flexibility provided by Halo 
and the elimination of the Seagate test.78 
b. Misconduct  
Some courts have found that a patentee must plausibly plead facts 
alleging knowing, intentional, deliberate, or even “egregious”79 patent 
infringement to sufficiently state a claim for willful infringement. A 
majority of courts in the Ninth Circuit, for example, have explained 
that allegations of mere pre-suit knowledge of the patent and 
continued engagement in the allegedly infringing activity are not 
enough to survive a motion to dismiss.80 And some courts have relied 
on Halo’s affirmation that enhanced damages awards should be limited 
 
 77. Preferential Networks IP, LLC v. AT&T Inc. Mobility, LLC, No. 2:16-CV-01374-
JRG-RSP, 2017 WL 3816109, at *4 (E.D. Tex. July 15, 2017); see T-Rex Prop. AB v. Regal 
Entm’t Grp., No. 6:16-cv-1029-RWS-KNM, 2017 WL 4229372, at *8 (E.D. Tex. Aug. 31, 
2017) (“Post-Halo, courts in [the Eastern District of Texas] have deemed allegations of 
willful infringement based on post-complaint conduct sufficient to survive Rule 
12(b)(6) scrutiny.”). 
 78. Huawei Techs. Co. v. T-Mobile US, Inc., Nos. 2:16-CV-00052-JRG-RSP, 2:16-CV-
00055-JRG-RSP, 2:16-CV-00056-JRG-RSP, 2:16-CV-00057-JRG-RSP, 2017 WL 1129951, 
at *4 (E.D. Tex. Feb. 21, 2017) (citation omitted). But see Wis. Alumni Research 
Found., 261 F. Supp. 3d at 917–18 & n.6 (“[Halo] did not upset the Federal Circuit’s 
holding in Seagate that the focus of such a claim should be on prelitigation conduct.”). 
 79. Välinge Innovation AB v. Halstead New England Corp., No. 16-1082-LPS-CJB, 
2018 WL 2411218, at *6 (D. Del. May 29, 2018) (“[A]fter having further considered 
Halo and Federal Circuit precedent, the Court has now determined that it was 
wrong . . . . [T]he Court [now] concludes that ‘egregiousness’ should not be a part of 
the calculus for determining whether a patentee has set out a plausible claim of willful 
infringement.”); see also id. (collecting cases). 
 80. See, e.g., Document Sec. Sys., Inc. v. Lite-On, Inc., No. CV 17-06050 JVS(JCGx), 
2018 WL 2422589, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 5, 2018); XpertUniverse, Inc. v. Cisco Sys., Inc., 
No. 17-cv-03848-RS, 2017 WL 4551519, at *6 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 11, 2017); CG Tech. Dev., 
LLC v. Zynga, Inc., No. 2:16-cv-00859-RCG-VCF, 2017 WL 662489, at *4 (D. Nev. Feb. 
17, 2017); see also Novartis Vaccines & Diagnostics, Inc. v. Regeneron Pharm., Inc., No. 
18CV2434(DLC), 2018 WL 5282887, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 24, 2018). 
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“to egregious cases of misconduct beyond typical infringement.”81 In 
dismissing without prejudice the patentee’s willful infringement 
claims, the court in Continental Circuits LLC v. Intel Corp.82 explained that 
the patentee must sufficiently allege both (1) knowledge of the patent 
at the time of the challenged conduct and (2) “egregious” behavior.83 
The Federal Circuit recently stated, in Eko Brands, LLC v. Adrian 
Rivera Maynez Enterprises, Inc.,84 that willfulness “requires a jury to find 
no more than deliberate or intentional infringement,” whereas 
“considerations of egregious behavior and punishment are relevant” 
when the district court addresses whether to enhance damages.85 
Going forward, some district courts might not require allegations of 
“egregious” conduct but may consider whether the patentee has 
plausibly pled misconduct—or more than typical infringement—to 
survive a motion to dismiss a willfulness claim.86 
c. Practice tips 
When drafting a complaint, the patent owner should see if the 
anticipated jurisdiction has any pleading requirements for seeking 
enhanced damages for willful infringement. If the patent owner does 
not adequately plead willful infringement, the accused infringer may 
want to file a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which 
relief can be granted under Rule 12(b)(6). Although several district 
courts have granted motions to dismiss bare allegations of willful 
infringement, others have not.87 Such motions take time and money, 
and even when successful, any dismissal would likely be without 
prejudice to patentee filing an amended complaint if the facts permit. 
 
 81. Document Sec. Sys., 2018 WL 2422589, at *1 (quoting Halo, 136 S. Ct. at 1932, 
1935) (emphasis added); see also, e.g., CG Tech., 2017 WL 662489, at *4; XpertUniverse, 
2017 WL 4551519, at *6. 
 82. No. CV16-2026 PHX DGC, 2017 WL 2651709 (D. Ariz. June 19, 2017). 
 83. Id. at *11. 
 84. 946 F.3d 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2020). 
 85. Id. at 1378.  
 86. See, e.g., NNCrystal US Corp. v. Nanosys, Inc., No. CV19-1307-RGA, 2020 WL 
616307, at *4 (D. Del. Feb. 10, 2020) (“To plead a claim of willful infringement, the 
complaint must allege that the accused infringer knew of the patent-in-suit, and 
knowingly or intentionally infringed the patent after acquiring that knowledge.” 
(citing Eko Brands, 946 F.3d at 1378-79)).  
 87. Compare Blackberry Ltd. v. Nokia Corp., No. 17-cv-155-RGA, 2018 WL 1401330, at *3–
4 (D. Del. Mar. 20, 2018) (dismissing a bare allegation of willful infringement), with 
MyMedicalRecords, Inc. v. Jardogs, LLC, 1 F. Supp. 3d 1020, 1026 (C.D. Cal. 2014) (denying 
a motion to dismiss and finding that patentee had adequately pleaded willful infringement). 
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There are several considerations that weigh for and against filing 
such a motion, including party and judicial resources. Filing an early 
motion to dismiss could result in delaying the litigation and/or making 
the patentee appear unprepared at the outset. 
Further, such an early motion will drive up litigation costs for both 
parties. The accused infringer may need to spend money on the 
motion to dismiss and potentially oppose a subsequent motion for 
leave to amend the complaint. The patentee will need to consider 
whether to spend resources (1) opposing the motion to dismiss 
because the willfulness claim is sufficiently pled; (2) amending the 
complaint, if possible, to address any alleged deficiencies; and/or (3) 
subsequently moving for leave to amend the complaint if the discovery 
or other facts bear out a plausible willful infringement claim. To 
reduce or eliminate such costs, the parties could use this opportunity 
to negotiate a potential settlement or some other mutually beneficial 
arrangement, for example, a consent motion to extend time to 
respond after an amended complaint is filed. Before filing any such 
motion, the accused infringer will need to carefully consider the 
relevant court’s jurisprudence and the specific facts of the case. 
2. Summary judgment of no willful infringement 
Some accused infringers have successfully moved for summary 
judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 because there was 
no genuine dispute as to any material fact concerning patentee’s 
willfulness claim. Although several motions were denied,88 some were 
granted.89 As with motions to dismiss, in deciding summary judgment 
motions district courts focused on whether (1) there was evidence that 
 
 88. See, e.g., Asia Vital Components Co. v. Asetek Danmark A/S, 377 F. Supp. 3d 
990, 1022 (N.D. Cal. 2019) (denying motion for summary judgment regarding 
enhanced damages because a jury could reasonably find willful infringement when 
presented with evidence that accused infringer “knew about the patents soon after they 
issued” and “unsuccessfully tried to [license] the . . . patents”); Sound View 
Innovations, LLC v. Hulu, LLC, No. LA-CV-17-04146 JAK (PLAx), 2019 WL 4640393, 
at *5 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 5, 2019) (denying summary judgment of no willful infringement 
because there was a genuine issue of material fact with respect to alleged infringer’s 
control over a third party and intent during the six months between when it learned 
of the asserted patents and the filing of the complaint). 
 89. See, e.g., bioMérieux, S.A. v. Hologic, Inc., No. 18-21-LPS, 2020 WL 759546, at 
*13 (D. Del. Feb. 7, 2020); Power Integrations, Inc. v. ON Semiconductor Corp., 396 
F. Supp. 3d 851, 891–92 (N.D. Cal. 2019); Olaf Sööt Design, LLC v. Daktronics, Inc., 
325 F. Supp. 3d 456, 462 (S.D.N.Y. 2018); EcoServices, LLC v. Certified Aviation Servs., 
LLC, 312 F. Supp. 3d 830, 842 (C.D. Cal. 2018). 
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the accused infringer had pre-suit knowledge of the patent(s)-in-suit 
and/or (2) the accused infringer allegedly engaged in misconduct. 
a. Requisite knowledge 
Without facts supporting knowledge of the alleged patent 
infringement, courts have granted motions for summary judgment of 
no willful infringement. In doing so, courts have recognized that 
“[k]nowledge of the patent alleged to be willfully infringed continues 
to be a prerequisite to enhanced damages.”90 
In granting the accused infringer’s motion for summary judgment 
on patentee’s willfulness claim, the court in Olaf Sööt Design, LLC v. 
Daktronics Hoist, Inc.91 explained that when the accused infringer points 
to an absence of record evidence concerning its knowledge of the 
asserted patent, summary judgment is proper.92 Similarly, the court in 
Power Integrations, Inc. v. ON Semiconductor Corp.93 granted in part a 
motion for summary judgment where the patentee produced no 
evidence that the accused infringer had pre-suit notice of patent 
infringement and the patentee lacked evidence or arguments to 
support its willful infringement claim.94 
As with motions to dismiss, some courts separately consider pre-suit 
and post-suit willfulness allegations. In granting summary judgment of 
no pre-suit willful infringement, the district court in EcoServices, LLC v. 
Certified Aviation Services, LLC95 explained that by failing to show pre-
suit knowledge of the patent, the patentee “failed to establish a 
prerequisite of willfulness.”96 The district court, however, denied the 
motion as to willfulness following service of the complaint, which of 
course put the accused infringer on notice of the asserted patents.97 
b. Knowledge alone is insufficient 
Relying on Justice Breyer’s concurrence in Halo, some courts have 
found that knowledge of an asserted patent alone does not create a 
 
 90. EcoServices, LLC, 312 F. Supp. 3d at 842 (quoting WBIP, LLC v. Kohler Co., 829 
F.3d 1317, 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2016)). 
 91. 325 F. Supp. 3d 456 (S.D.N.Y. 2018). 
 92. Id. at 461. 
 93. 396 F. Supp. 3d 851 (N.D. Cal. 2019). 
 94. Id. at 891–92. 
 95. 312 F. Supp. 3d 830 (C.D. Cal. 2018). 
 96. Id. at 842. 
 97. Id. at 842 n.12. 
2020] THE HALO EFFECT 1083 
 
genuine issue of material fact when no other willful misconduct is 
alleged.98 For example, in Vehicle IP, LLC v. AT&T Mobility LLC,99 the district 
court granted summary judgment because no reasonable jury could find 
willful infringement based solely on pre-suit knowledge of the patent.100 
Some courts have deemed willful blindness—which at most establishes 
“actual knowledge”—without more similarly insufficient to show 
“egregious behavior.”101 In Ansell Healthcare Products LLC v. Reckitt Benckiser 
LLC,102 the district court granted a motion for summary judgment of no 
willful infringement because the patentee failed to allege that the accused 
infringer “engaged in any sort of ‘egregious’ behavior while knowing or 
being willfully blind to the patents-in-suit.”103 
Additionally, some district courts have found that a citation to a 
patent number in Patent Office correspondence alone does not support 
a willful infringement finding. Indeed, in Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. 
Symantec Corp.,104 the district court granted the accused infringer’s 
motion for summary judgment of no willful infringement 
notwithstanding the fact that the accused infringer cited the asserted 
patent in prosecuting two of its own patents because even if the accused 
infringer had knowledge of the asserted patent, “pre-suit knowledge 
alone is not sufficient to support a finding of willful infringement.”105 
c. Misconduct 
Some courts have granted summary judgment when “a reasonable 
factfinder could not find that [the accused infringer] engaged in the 
type of egregious conduct to permit a finding of willful infringement, 
even taking the evidence in the light most favorable to [the 
patentee].”106 For example, the district court in Plastic Omnium Advanced 
 
 98. Ansell Healthcare Prods. LLC v. Reckitt Benckiser LLC, No. 15-cv-915-RGA, 
2018 WL 620968, at *6 (D. Del. Jan. 30, 2018) (“[A] party’s pre-suit knowledge of the 
patent is not by itself sufficient to find ‘willful misconduct’ such that the Court can 
award enhanced damages.” (citing Halo Elecs., Inc. v. Pulse Elecs., 136 S. Ct. 1923, 
1936 (2016) (Breyer, J., concurring))). 
 99. 227 F. Supp. 3d 319 (D. Del. 2016). 
 100. Id. at 331. 
 101. Ansell, 2018 WL 620968, at *7. 
 102. No. 15-cv-915-RGA, 2018 WL 620968 (D. Del. Jan. 30, 2018). 
 103. Id. at *8. 
 104. 234 F. Supp. 3d 601 (D. Del. 2017), aff’d, 725 F. App’x 976 (Fed. Cir. 2018). 
 105. Id. at 611–12. 
 106. Plastic Omnium Advanced Innovation & Research v. Donghee Am., Inc., 387 
F. Supp. 3d 404, 421 (D. Del. 2018). 
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Innovation & Research v. Donghee America, Inc.107 granted summary 
judgment of no pre-suit willful infringement where in the “[l]ess than 
a month of pre-suit conduct” the accused infringer merely declined to 
design around the patent.108 Further, the district court found that the 
record was devoid of evidence of post-complaint willful infringement 
where the accused infringer simply continued to sell the accused 
product and made preparations for future sales.109 
Applying Halo, some district courts have granted summary judgment 
of no willful infringement because no reasonable jury could find 
willfulness absent evidence of misconduct beyond typical infringement. 
For example, in granting summary judgment, the district court in 
Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Symantec Corp.110 explained that the accused 
infringer’s continuing to “update, produce, and sell” the accused 
product even after the suit was filed could not support willful 
infringement because such behavior is not “beyond typical 
infringement.”111 Similarly, in Move, Inc. v. Real Estate Alliance Ltd.,112 
the district court granted a summary judgment motion after 
determining that the accused infringer conducted no “misconduct 
beyond typical infringement.”113 The court concluded that, at most, 
the evidence showed the accused infringer continued to use the 
allegedly infringing method after learning of the asserted patent, but 
the accused infringer advanced “several reasonable arguments as to 
why its conduct was non-infringing.”114 The court in bioMérieux, S.A. v. 
Hologic, Inc.115 granted summary judgment of no willful infringement 
where the accused infringers were prior inventors in the same patent 
space and continued to sell the accused products after litigation 
commenced.116 The court explained that the fact that the accused 
infringers “continued to market the products they sold even before 
[patentees] obtained the patents-in-suit, and did not shift to another 
product (even if they could have done so without much delay or 
expense),” did not show that the accused infringers willfully 
 
 107. 387 F. Supp. 3d 404 (D. Del. 2018). 
 108. Id. at 421. 
 109. Id. at 422. 
 110. 234 F. Supp. 3d 601 (D. Del. 2017), aff’d, 725 F. App’x 976 (Fed. Cir. 2018). 
 111. Id. at 612. 
 112. 221 F. Supp. 3d 1149 (C.D. Cal. 2016), aff’d in part, 721 F. App’x 950 (Fed. Cir. 2018). 
 113. Id. at 1173. 
 114. Id. 
 115. No. 18-21-LPS, 2020 WL 759546 (D. Del. Feb. 7, 2020). 
 116. Id. at *11–13. 
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infringed.117 And the court in SiOnyx, LLC v. Hamamatsu Photonics K.K.118 
granted summary judgment of no willful infringement when the accused 
infringer, after learning of the asserted patents, “merely continued to sell” 
the accused product during a “garden-variety” patent suit.119 
d. Practice tips 
If the allegations underlying patentee’s willful infringement claim 
amount to “typical” or “garden-variety” infringement, an accused 
infringer should consider filing a motion for summary judgment of no 
willful infringement. Even if unsuccessful, such a motion may put the 
district court on notice of the thin evidence in the record that the 
patentee seeks to rely on to support its willfulness claim. For example, 
in Finjan, Inc. v. Eset, LLC,120 the district court denied a motion for 
summary judgment of no willful infringement, but cautioned the 
patentee that it must produce evidence at trial showing that the 
accused infringer “had knowledge of each of the asserted patents and 
committed subjective willful infringement as of the dates it became 
aware of those patents.”121 
If, on the other hand, the facts regarding willful infringement are 
overwhelming, a patentee may wish to file a motion for summary judgment 
of willfulness. There are, however, several downsides to filing such a motion. 
As an initial matter, courts are hesitant to grant such motions when the 
question could simply be sent to the jury. Moreover, the facts bearing on 
such a claim are typically jury-friendly and advance the patentee’s case. 
B.   Willfulness Resolved on the Trial Record 
If a willful infringement claim is not disposed of before trial, the 
issue will most likely be set for trial before a jury. A majority of juries 
have found any infringement to be willful.122 Although not common, 
 
 117. Id. at *12. 
 118. 330 F. Supp. 3d 574 (D. Mass. 2018). 
 119. Id. at 613. 
 120. No. 17-183-CAB-BGS, 2019 WL 5212394 (S.D. Cal. Oct. 16, 2019), 
reconsideration granted, No. 17-183-CAB-BGS, 2019 WL 7290961 (S.D. Cal. Dec. 30, 
2019) (dismissing the willful infringement claim). 
 121. Id. at *6. 
 122. This could be in part due to self-selection. As discussed above, the district court 
can dismiss the claim at the outset on a motion to dismiss or on a motion for summary 
judgment. In addition, where willfulness is not a close call—for example, where there is no 
evidence of knowledge of the patent pre-suit, and the accused infringer adopted a non-
infringing alternative design post-suit—the patentee may elect to drop the claim. There are 
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some district courts have granted motions for judgment as a matter of 
law that any infringement was not willful. Some courts have granted 
such a motion before the issue is put to the jury and others have found 
that substantial evidence did not support the jury’s verdict of willful 
infringement post-trial. Exemplary cases are discussed below. 
1. Judgment as a matter of law of no willful infringement 
Accused infringers may be able to avoid a jury verdict on a patentee’s 
willful infringement claim by filing a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 
50(a) motion for judgment as a matter of law of no willful infringement 
before the case is submitted to the jury. The court may grant such a 
motion “[i]f a party has been fully heard on an issue during a jury trial 
and the court finds that a reasonable jury would not have a legally 
sufficient evidentiary basis to find for the party on that issue.”123 In 
Bayer Healthcare LLC v. Baxalta Inc.,124 the district court granted the 
accused infringers’ Rule 50(a) motion because “there was insufficient 
evidence at trial to support a finding of willful infringement by either 
[accused infringer].”125 In granting an accused infringer’s Rule 50(a) 
motion in TecSec, Inc. v. Adobe Inc.,126 the district court explained that 
“even if post-suit conduct alone were sufficient for a finding of willful 
infringement, and even if the jury would have agreed with [the patentee] 
that [the accused infringer] willfully infringed, an award of enhanced 
damages would not have been appropriate under the facts in this case.”127 
If a jury finds that an infringer acted willfully, the infringer can 
challenge the jury’s determination post-trial by renewing its motion for 
judgment as a matter of law or, in the alternative, moving for a new 
trial pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 50(b). In fact, in SRI 
International, Inc. v. Cisco Systems, Inc.,128 the Federal Circuit vacated and 
remanded a denial of the accused infringer’s renewed motion for 
judgment as a matter of law of no willful infringement where the 
 
of course cases where courts sent willfulness claims to the jury, and the jury found no willful 
infringement. See, e.g., Columbia Sportswear N. Am., Inc. v. Seirus Innovative Accessories, 
Inc., No. 3:17-cv-01781-HZ, 2018 WL 1805101, at *1 (S.D. Cal. Apr. 17, 2018); Evonik 
Degussa GmbH v. Materia, Inc., 305 F. Supp. 3d 563, 580 (D. Del. 2018); EMC Corp. v. 
Zerto, Inc., No. 12-956 (GMS), 2017 WL 3434212, at *5 (D. Del. Aug. 10, 2017). 
 123. Fed. R. Civ. P. 50(a)(1). 
 124. No. 16-1122-RGA, 2019 WL 4016235 (D. Del. Aug. 26, 2019). 
 125. Id. at *9. 
 126. No. 10-115, 2019 WL 1233882 (E.D. Va. Mar. 14, 2019). 
 127. Id. at *3. 
 128. 930 F.3d 1295 (Fed. Cir. 2019). 
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accused product was developed independently about six years before 
the accused infringer first had notice of the patents-in-suit.129 The 
Federal Circuit disagreed with the district court that the jury’s willfulness 
determination was supported by substantial evidence based on (1) the 
accused infringer’s engineers failed to read the patents-in-suit until their 
depositions; and (2) the accused infringer designed “the [accused] 
products and services in an infringing manner” and “instructed its 
customers to use the products and services in an infringing manner.”130 
The Federal Circuit also considered additional evidence identified 
to support the jury’s willfulness verdict, but concluded that even when 
weighing all inferences in the patentee’s favor, the evidence in the 
record was insufficient.131 The Federal Circuit explained that the jury’s 
verdict of willful infringement before patentee sent its notice letter was 
not supported by substantial evidence because the accused infringer 
undisputedly lacked notice of the asserted patent.132 The Federal 
Circuit cautioned that Halo requires culpability to be assessed based on 
what the accused infringer knew at the time of the challenged 
conduct.133 The Federal Circuit, however, remanded the case so the 
district court could decide in the first instance whether substantial 
evidence supports the jury’s willfulness finding after patentee’s notice 
letter given the legal standard and the court’s analysis regarding 
patentee’s willfulness evidence.134 
2. Jury verdict of willful infringement supported by substantial evidence 
Many juries presented with the issue post-Halo have found that 
infringing conduct is willful. Although any such finding is fact specific 
and based on “the particular circumstances of each case,”135 as 
highlighted below, certain evidence repeatedly has been found to 
support a willfulness verdict.136 
 
 129. Id. at 1309, 1312. 
 130. Id. at 1308. 
 131. Id. at 1308–09. 
 132. Id. at 1309. 
 133. Id. at 1309–10. 
 134. Id. at 1310. 
 135. Halo Elecs., Inc. v. Pulse Elecs., Inc., 136 S. Ct. 1923, 1933 (2016). 
 136. Having an opinion of counsel or lack thereof is not indicative of whether any 
infringement may be found willful. In fact, cases go both ways. See, e.g., Acantha LLC 
v. DePuy Synthes Sales Inc., 406 F. Supp. 3d 742, 755 (E.D. Wis. 2019) (finding willful 
infringement notwithstanding infringer’s opinions of counsel where there was no 
evidence of reliance on those opinions); Schwendimann v. Arkwright Advanced 
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a. Copying 
Courts may consider evidence of copying to support a willfulness 
determination. In Apple Inc. v. Samsung Electronics Co.,137 the district court 
explained that substantial evidence supported the jury’s finding of 
willfulness in part due to “evidence that Samsung engaged in copying.”138 
Also, in Polara Engineering Inc. v. Campbell Co.,139 the Federal Circuit 
affirmed the denial of a motion for judgment as a matter of law seeking 
to overturn the jury’s finding of willful infringement.140 The Federal 
Circuit agreed that “[b]ased on the evidence adduced at trial, the jury 
reasonably could have found that [the infringer] intentionally copied the 
[asserted] patent despite a significant known risk that its [product] would 
infringe . . . .”141 Similarly, on remand from the Federal Circuit, the district 
court in Exmark Manufacturing Co. v. Briggs & Stratton Corp.142 found that 
“outright and deliberate copying” constitutes willful infringement.143 
b. Knowledge of infringement 
Courts may consider evidence regarding the infringer’s knowledge 
and awareness of infringement to support a willfulness determination. 
In Vectura Ltd. v. GlaxoSmithKline LLC,144 the district court held that the 
jury’s verdict of willful infringement was supported by substantial 
evidence, including evidence that “[d]efendants’ own pre-suit testing 
 
Coating, Inc., No. CV 11-820 (JRT/HB), 2018 WL 3621206, at *18–19 (D. Minn. July 
30, 2018) (finding no willful infringement despite absence of opinion of counsel and 
reiterating that “there is no affirmative obligation to obtain [an] opinion of counsel” 
(quoting In re Seagate Tech., LLC, 497 F.3d 1360, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2007))); Halo Elecs., 
Inc. v. Pulse Elecs., Inc., 281 F. Supp. 3d 1087, 1091 (D. Nev. 2017) (finding on remand 
no willful infringement where infringer had an opinion of counsel). This may not be 
surprising in view of the fact that 35 U.S.C. § 298 provides that “[t]he failure of an 
infringer to obtain the advice of counsel” or “the failure of the infringer to present 
such advice to the court or jury, may not be used to prove that the accused infringer 
willfully infringed.” Halo, 136 S. Ct. at 1935 (quoting 35 U.S.C. § 298 (2012)). And as 
the Federal Circuit reiterated in SRI International, Inc. v. Cisco Systems, Inc., an accused 
infringer’s “decision not to seek an advice-of-counsel defense is legally irrelevant under 
35 U.S.C. § 298.” 930 F.3d 1295, 1309 (Fed. Cir. 2019). 
 137. 258 F. Supp. 3d 1013 (N.D. Cal. 2017). 
 138. Id. at 1027. 
 139. 894 F.3d 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2018). 
 140. Id. at 1353–54. 
 141. Id. 
 142. 348 F. Supp. 3d 907 (D. Neb. 2018). 
 143. Id. at 919. 
 144. 397 F. Supp. 3d 579 (D. Del. 2019). 
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provided information from which [d]efendants would have known 
their products infringed the asserted patent.”145 In Chamberlain Group, 
Inc. v. Techtronic Industries Co.146, the district court denied the 
infringer’s motion to overturn the jury’s willfulness finding. The court 
explained that the jury heard evidence that the accused infringer was 
“put on notice of [one asserted] patent and the general dangers of 
possibly treading on [patentee’s] IP,” and it “investigated possible IP 
pitfalls and learned about the [other asserted] patent as far back as 2010,” 
and yet did nothing to avoid infringement.147 As a result, a reasonable jury 
could conclude from this evidence that the accused infringer willfully 
infringed.148 Similarly, in Arctic Cat Inc. v. Bombardier Recreational Products, 
Inc.,149 in denying the accused infringer’s motion for judgment as a matter 
of law, the district court explained that the infringer’s IP specialist was 
aware of the patents at issue before they issued and “made a note in his 
file to reexamine the patent after its issuance.”150 
c. Disregard for the risk of infringement 
Courts also may consider evidence regarding the infringer’s disregard 
for, or willful blindness to, the risk of infringement to support a willfulness 
determination. In Apple Inc. v. Samsung Electronics Co., the district court 
found that there was substantial evidence for the jury’s willfulness finding 
in part due to evidence showing Samsung could have, but decided not to, 
adopt a “less desirable non-infringing alternative.”151 And in Arctic Cat, the 
district court explained that the infringer, despite understanding the 
relevance of the asserted patent, “chose not to seek advice of qualified and 
competent counsel until much later, after unsuccessfully attempting to 
purchase [the patentee’s] patents through a third party.”152 
 
 145. Id. at 593. 
 146. 315 F. Supp. 3d 977 (N.D. Ill. 2018), aff’d in part, vacated in part, rev’d in part sub 
nom. Chamberlain Grp., Inc. v. Techtronic Indus. Co., 935 F.3d 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2019). 
After concluding that the asserted claims are invalid for one of the asserted patents, 
which was the primary focus of the district court’s analysis, the Federal Circuit vacated 
the enhanced damages award and remanded for the district court to reconsider 
whether the award is warranted with respect to only the other asserted patent. 
Chamberlain Grp., Inc., 935 F.3d at 1352. 
 147. Chamberlain Grp., 315 F. Supp. 3d at 997, 1002. 
 148. Id. 
 149. 198 F. Supp. 3d 1343 (S.D. Fla. 2016), aff’d, 876 F.3d 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2017). 
 150. Id. at 1348. 
 151. Apple Inc. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., 258 F. Supp. 3d 1013, 1027 (N.D. Cal. 2017). 
 152. Arctic Cat, 198 F. Supp. 3d at 1348. 
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d. Dishonesty or lack of candor 
Courts may also consider evidence of dishonest behavior to support 
a jury’s willful infringement determination. In Izzo Golf Inc. v. King Par 
Golf Inc.,153 the district court considered the infringer’s dishonesty, 
among other factors, in upholding the jury’s willfulness verdict.154 The 
court explained that the jury could have made reasonable inferences 
that the infringer was aware of the patent at issue, “the infringement 
was not innocent,” the infringer “was not truthful concerning the 
number of infringing bags that it sold,” and the infringer “did not stop 
selling infringing bags in the first quarter of 2002 as it claimed.”155 And 
in Spectrum Laboratories, LLC v. Dr. Greens, Inc.,156 the district court 
explained that the jury’s finding of willfulness was supported by 
evidence.157 The court described a litany of misdeeds, including the 
infringer’s selling off its inventory of the accused product after litigation 
had commenced and failing to maintain any samples, “secretly 
chang[ing] suppliers and formulas” without advising the patentee or 
the court, and “covering up the infringing activity in its effort to 
deceive [the patentee] as to the nature of its infringing product.”158 
3. Practice tips 
Patentees should work to obtain all evidence of any knowledge of 
infringement, blatant or reckless disregard for the risk of infringement, 
dishonesty or lack of candor, copying, and anything that bolsters a claim 
that the accused infringer is a “wanton and malicious pirate.”159 
Conversely, the accused infringer should obtain all evidence establishing 
an absence of these facts. It is good practice to move for Rule 50(a) 
judgment as a matter of law. Even if such a motion is not successful, it 
preserves the litigant’s rights and may put the district court on notice 
of the thin evidence in the record to support the patentee’s willful 
infringement claim and any subsequent request for enhanced 
damages.160 Further, any Rule 50(a) motion should be renewed post-
 
 153. No. 02-CV-6012 CJS, 2019 WL 4023562 (W.D.N.Y. Aug. 26, 2019). 
 154. Id. at *7. 
 155. Id. at *2. 
 156. No. 11cv0638-JAH (KSC), 2019 WL 1317725 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 22, 2019). 
 157. Id. at *2. 
 158. Id. 
 159. See Halo Elecs., Inc. v. Pulse Elecs., Inc., 136 S. Ct. 1923, 1928 (2016) (quoting 
Seymour v. McCormick, 57 U.S. 480, 488 (1854)). 
 160. See infra Section III.C. 
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trial along with a motion for a new trial in the alternative, if 
appropriate, under Rule 50(b). 
C.   Enhanced Damages 
District courts typically address whether to enhance damages “once 
an affirmative finding of willfulness has been made” by the jury or 
factfinder.161 At this stage, “considerations of egregious behavior and 
punishment are relevant.”162 As the Federal Circuit reiterated in 
Presidio Components, Inc. v. American Technical Ceramics Corp.,163 “an 
award of enhanced damages does not necessarily flow from a 
willfulness finding.”164 Halo explained that “[d]istrict courts enjoy 
discretion in deciding whether to award enhanced damages, and in 
what amount.”165 While “such damages are generally reserved for 
egregious cases of culpable behavior,”166 the Supreme Court has not 
propagated any particular test by which such behavior should be 
identified. At bottom, the district court should consider the totality of 
the circumstances to determine whether enhancement is appropriate 
on a case-by-case basis. Indeed, courts have recognized that the 
“continued sale of the infringing product without removing its 
infringing capability is merely typical infringement behavior that is not 
a proper basis for enhanced damages.”167 
As may be expected, district courts have employed a variety of 
approaches in evaluating whether a willful infringer should be subject 
to enhanced damages after Halo. Some courts have taken a holistic 
approach, walking through the facts of the case and determining 
whether enhanced damages are appropriate considering the overall 
factual posture.168 Other courts walk through the Read factors, 
 
 161. Eko Brands, LLC v. Adrian Rivera Maynez Enters., Inc., 946 F.3d 1367, 1378 
(Fed. Cir. 2020). 
 162. Id. 
 163. 875 F.3d 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2017). 
 164. Id. at 1382; see Halo, 136 S. Ct. at 1933 (“[N]one of this is to say that enhanced 
damages must follow a finding of egregious misconduct.”). 
 165. Halo, 136 S. Ct. at 1932. 
 166. Id. 
 167. TecSec, Inc. v. Adobe Inc., No. 1:10-cv-115, 2019 WL 1233882, at *2 (E.D. Va. 
Mar. 14, 2019); see also Halo, 136 S. Ct. at 1931. 
 168. See, e.g., Halo Elecs., Inc. v. Pulse Elecs., Inc., 281 F. Supp. 3d 1087, 1092–95 
(D. Nev. 2017); Presidio Components, Inc. v. Am. Tech. Ceramics Corp., No. 14-CV-
02061-H-BGS, 2016 WL 4377096, at *20–21 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 17, 2016), aff’d in part, 
vacated in part, remanded, 875 F.3d 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2017). 
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examining whether they support or detract from enhancement.169 
Regardless of the framework applied, district courts have focused on the 
egregiousness of the behavior and assess whether the infringer is a “wanton 
and malicious pirate” who should be subject to enhanced damages.170 
Even where some (or many) Read factors come out in favor of 
enhancement, the court may still decline to award enhanced damages 
if the infringer’s behavior was within the realm of a reasonable 
adversary. For example, in Acantha LLC v. DePuy Synthes Sales Inc.,171 
even though the court found that several Read factors at least somewhat 
supported enhancing damages, the court reviewed “the totality of the 
circumstances” and declined to enhance damages.172 The court noted 
that the infringers’ behavior did not sink to the level of “‘wanton and 
malicious pirate[s]’ deserving of punishment.”173 
Similarly, in Greatbatch Ltd. v. AVX Corp.,174 the district court declined 
to enhance damages where the infringer took remedial action in an 
effort to avoid infringement and had a good faith belief of non-
infringement.175 The district court also explained the case was close as 
the jury was unable to reach a unanimous decision on willfulness.176 In 
denying the patentee’s request for enhanced damages even though there 
had not been a final determination on willfulness, the court explained 
that having had already conducted two trials on the asserted patents and 
accused products, it was in a position to have thoroughly considered the 
totality of the circumstances for enhancement purposes.177 
In evaluating whether to enhance damages, some courts have 
considered the jury’s damages award. In cases in which the jury finds 
willful infringement and awards compensatory damages, absent a 
special verdict form, it is difficult to know by how much (if any) the 
jury may have increased damages due to the accused infringer’s willful 
conduct (even if instructed not to do so). But some courts have 
 
 169. See, e.g., Siemens Mobility, Inc. v. Westinghouse Air Brake Techs. Corp., No. 
16-284-LPS, 2019 WL 3240521, at *7–9 (D. Del. July 18, 2019). 
 170. See, e.g., Sociedad Espanola de Electromedicina y Calidad, S.A. v. Blue Ridge 
X-Ray Co, Inc., 226 F. Supp. 3d 520, 531 (W.D.N.C. 2016), aff’d, 721 F. App’x 989 (Fed. 
Cir. 2018) (quoting Halo, 136 S. Ct. at 1932). 
 171. 406 F. Supp. 3d 742 (E.D. Wis. 2019). 
 172. Id. at 758–62. 
 173. Id. at 762 (quoting Seymour v. McCormick, 57 U.S. 480, 488 (1854)). 
 174. No. 13-723-LPS, 2018 WL 1568872 (D. Del. Mar. 30, 2018). 
 175. Id. at *6–7. 
 176. Id. 
 177. Id. at *7. 
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recognized that the jury’s award is a factor in declining to enhance 
damages. For example, in Kolcraft Enterprises, Inc. v. Chicco USA, Inc.,178 
the district court explained: 
[W]ith the Read factors weighing only slightly in Kolcraft’s favor, 
there is a unique circumstance that dictates, in the Court’s view, 
rejection of enhanced damages: the jury’s decision to use the 7.7% 
royalty rate. Although the Court has rejected the need for a new trial 
on damages, the rate still resulted in almost a half-million dollars more 
compensation than what Kolcraft asked for. This premium amount 
outweighs the slight advantage that the Read factors give to Kolcraft; 
the balance flips back in favor of declining enhanced damages.179 
Similarly, in Sociedad Espanola de Electromedicina y Calidad, S.A. v. Blue 
Ridge X-Ray Co, Inc.,180 the court observed that the jury awarded 
damages that were nearly three times the amount advocated as a 
reasonable royalty by the patentee’s expert, apparently considering the 
profits realized by the infringing sales.181 The court found that the 
patentee had been “amply compensated for the [d]efendants’ 
infringement,” which weighed against enhanced damages.182 And in 
declining to enhance damages in Brigham & Women’s Hospital, Inc. v. 
Perrigo Co.,183 the district court noted that “the jury’s award of $10,210,071 
in damages [was] at the high end of the damages sought,” roughly 
equating to six times the royalty amount used in other licenses.184 
1. Practice tips 
Litigants should be mindful that the district court may rely on the 
Read factors in deciding whether to enhance damages. Patentees may 
seek to rely on fact-specific evidence that bears out at trial to support 
their claim for enhanced damages for any willful infringement. On the 
other hand, given that several courts have declined to enhance 
damages even where there is a finding of willfulness, accused infringers 
could ask courts to consider whether they would enhance before the 
issue of willfulness goes to a jury.185 If the court concludes that the 
 
 178. No. 09-CV-03339, 2019 WL 4242482 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 6, 2019). 
 179. Id. at *21. 
 180. 226 F. Supp. 3d 520 (W.D.N.C. 2016), aff’d, 721 F. App’x 989 (Fed. Cir. 2018). 
 181. Id. at 533. 
 182. Id. 
 183. 251 F. Supp. 3d 285 (D. Mass. 2017). 
 184. Id. at 293. 
 185. Notably, in Exergen Corp. v. KAZ USA, Inc., the Federal Circuit concluded that the 
district court did not abuse its discretion in ruling on enhancement of damages without an 
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behavior of the accused infringer could not rise to the level of 
egregiousness required to award enhanced damages, removing the 
question of willful infringement from the case would likely save party 
and judicial resources. Such an approach may also save the jurors’ time 
and prevent the jury from being improperly influenced by evidence 
that may not be relevant to the issues to be decided. 
CONCLUSION 
The Supreme Court’s decision in Halo is an important reminder that 
enhanced damages are reserved for “egregious cases of culpable 
behavior.”186 As a result, patentees seeking enhanced damages should 
ensure that any willfulness claims are sufficiently pled and pursued. 
Conversely, accused infringers should consider whether to seek relief 
from the district court if the patentee fails to allege misconduct beyond 
typical, garden-variety infringement. Ultimately, district courts will bear 
the responsibility of continuing to serve in their gatekeeping role to 
ensure that any willful infringement claims are properly before the jury. 
 
underlying jury verdict and affirmed a post-trial denial of enhancement based on the 
district court’s consideration of the Read factors. 725 F. App’x 959, 972 (Fed. Cir. 2018). 
 186. Halo Elecs., Inc. v. Pulse Elecs., Inc., 136 S. Ct. 1923, 1932 (2016). 
